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Abstract 
 
We investigate the moral hazard problem in which the principal delegates multiple 
tasks to two agents. She imperfectly monitors the action choices by observing the public 
signals that are correlated through the macro shock and that satisfy conditional 
independence. When the number of tasks is sufficiently high, relative performance 
evaluation functions effectively for unique implementation, where the desirable action 
choices are supported by an approximate Nash equilibrium, and any approximate Nash 
equilibrium virtually induces the first-best allocation. Thus, this is an extremely 
effective method through which the principal divides the workers into two groups and 
makes them compete with each other. 
 
Keywords: Multitask Agency, Moral Hazard, Relative Performance Evaluation, Unique 
Implementation, Group Incentives. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D20, D80, J33, L23 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the agency problem in which a principal delegates multiple 
tasks to two agents. In this case, the principal is faced with a moral hazard problem as 
she is unable to directly observe the action choices adopted by the agents for their 
respective tasks, but can only imperfectly monitor them by observing the public signal 
for each task that is drawn randomly and is dependent on the action choice for the task. 
In order to incentivize the agents to adopt the desirable action choices for all the tasks, 
the principal designs a punishment rule that is dependent on the observed public signals. 
Based on this, the principal decides whether or not she should fine each agent a 
monetary amount. 
In this paper, we will show that as compared with a case in which only few tasks are 
delegated to each agent, it is easier for the principal to incentivize the agents when a 
large number of tasks are delegated. This statement implies the following. Consider a 
case in which the principal hires multiple workers and assigns each worker a single task. 
Instead of contracting with each worker individually, the principal divides them into 
two working groups and regards these groups as the agents with whom she makes a 
contract. Therefore, the members of each group agree to jointly adopt the action choices   4
for their tasks and maximize the sum of their expected payoffs. In this paper, we show 
that the establishment of such working groups along with relative performance 
evaluation might be an extremely effective method enabling the principal to resolve the 
moral hazard problem. 
We assume that the public signals are correlated through a randomly drawn macro 
shock; the realization of this shock is unobservable by the agents and the principal. The 
public signals for all the tasks depend not only on this common macro shock but also on 
their respective private factors; these factors are also unobservable by the agents and the 
principal. In this case, we assume conditional independence, i.e., given the occurrence 
of a macro shock, the public signals are drawn randomly and independently. 
We specify a punishment rule on the basis of the concept of relative performance 
evaluation as follows. Each agent’s performance is measured by the proportion of tasks 
performed by him/her for which good public signals occur. If an agent’s performance is 
unsatisfactory as compared with that of the other agent, the principal will fine this agent 
according to the relative performance evaluation method. However, if an agent’s 
performance is almost identical to that of the other agent, but sufficiently unsatisfactory 
in the absolute sense, the principal will fine this agent according to the absolute 
performance evaluation method.   5
In this paper, we show that the concept of relative performance evaluation functions 
very effectively, particularly when the number of tasks is sufficiently large. Note that 
according to the Law of Large Numbers, the private factors for all the tasks delegated to 
each agent can cancel out each other. This implies that by using the relative 
performance evaluation method, the principal can almost perfectly detect whether or not 
an agent deviated from the desirable action choices, as long as the other agent adopts the 
desirable action choices for all the tasks assigned to him/her. Hence, it follows that the 
agents have an incentive to adopt the desirable action choices for all the tasks as an 
approximate Nash equilibrium, where each agent’s gains from the deviation are either 
negligible or less than zero. 
Moreover, note that each agent is incentivized to perform slightly better than the 
other agent whenever the latter deviates from the desirable action choices for a 
non-negligible number of the tasks. By doing so, the agent can almost certainly escape 
the punishment based on the absolute performance evaluation method and consequently 
help the principal in detecting the deviation of the other agent. This implies that unique 
implementation is virtually possible, i.e., any approximate Nash equilibrium can induce 
the agent to adopt the desirable action choices for almost all the tasks. 
Many previous works have studied relative performance evaluation in the context of   6
the moral hazard problem, for instance, Holmstrom (1982), Lazear and Rosen (1981), 
Green and Stokey (1983), and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). However, these studies 
generally investigated the case in which each agent is delegated a single task.
3 They 
showed that in comparison with independent evaluation, relative performance 
evaluation provides for better risk sharing. However, the presence of the private factors 
generally prevents relative performance evaluation from achieving the first-best 
allocation even in the approximate sense, i.e., from achieving the desirable action 
choices without any substantial welfare loss that is caused by the risk-averse agents’ 
risk sharing. In contrast, this paper shows that relative performance evaluation can 
virtually achieve the first-best allocation when the number of tasks is sufficiently large 
and conditional independence is assumed; this is because the private factors can be 
cancelled out. 
This permissive result is robust with respect to the agents’ limited liability 
constraints. In fact, in cases where the principal can perfectly monitor the agents’ action 
choices and the number of tasks is sufficiently large, whenever the upper bound of the 
monetary fine is large enough to incentivize the agents, the principal can generally 
incentivize them even when faced with the moral hazard problem with imperfect 
                                                 
3  An exception is Franckx, D’Amato, and Brose (2004), which extended Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) to a multitask setting. See also Battaglini (2005). 
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monitoring.
4 
Several works, such as Mookherjee (1984), Demski and Sappington (1984), Ma 
(1988), and Battaglini (2005), have investigated unique implementation in the context 
of the moral hazard problem. When each agent is delegated only a few tasks and there 
exist private factors with regard to these tasks, the concept of relative performance 
evaluation does not function effectively for unique implementation. Hence, instead of 
employing this concept, these papers demonstrated alternative concepts of mechanism 
design in order to eliminate the unwanted equilibria; some of these were related to the 
concepts of mechanism design that were explored in the adverse selection literature 
regarding the implementation of social choice functions.
5 In contrast, this paper shows 
that if a sufficiently large number of tasks are delegated, relative performance 
evaluation can compel each agent to “blow the whistle” with regard to the other agent’s 
deviation in exchange for an exemption from the punishment based on the absolute 
performance evaluation method; thus, this will be the driving force behind the relative 
performance evaluation method and would enable the principal to eliminate any 
unwanted equilibria. 
                                                 
4 Legros and Matsushima (1991) investigated mechanism design in the context of the moral 
hazard problem for partnerships with limited liability. 
5  See, for instance, Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), Osborne and Rubinstein (2004, Chapter 10), 
and Maskin and Sjöström (2002).   8
In the agency literature, several studies such as Varian (1990), Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1990), and Itoh (1993) have analyzed cases in which there exist multiple 
workers and demonstrated the superiority of group decisions over individual decisions. 
In these studies, it was assumed that the members of each group mutually observe their 
action choices and design a side contract contingent on these choices; this contract is 
enforceable in non-judicial ways such as word of honor. For example, Tirole (1992) 
explains the manner in which the hidden side-contracting technology can be specified. 
Generally, these works only studied the behavior of a group that includes all the 
workers; nevertheless, in case of the occurrence of a macro shock, even this group has 
the incentive to deviate. In contrast, this paper examines a case in which there exist two 
separate groups that are identical in terms of the number of members and that compete 
with each other based on relative performance evaluation—which functions effectively, 
particularly when a macro shock occurs.   
Moreover, some previous works regarding multitask incentives used the Law of 
Large Numbers to cancel out the private factors. For instance, see bundling goods by a 
monopolist (Armstrong (1999)), multimarket contact (Matsushima (2001)), and linking 
mechanisms (Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) and Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi 
(2006)).   9
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
specifies a punishment rule based on relative performance evaluation. The main 
theorem and its logical core are presented in section 4. Section 5 provides the complete 
proof of this theorem. 
 
2. The Model 
 
  A principal hires agents 1 and 2 and delegates multiple tasks to each of them as 
follows.  n  number of tasks are delegated to each agent  {1, 2} i∈ , i.e., the tasks  ( ,1) i , 
(, 2 ) i , …, and ( , ) in, where  0 n >  is a positive integer. Thereafter, each of them 
selects a strategy  ,1 ()
n
ii h h aa = = , where  , ih a  implies the action choice for task  ( , ) ih. 
Let  , {0,1} ih A ≡  denote the set of actions for task  (, ) ih. In this case, action 1 for task 
(, ) ih, i.e.,  , 1 ih a = , implies the desirable action choice for this task, whereas action 0 
for task (, ) ih, i.e.,  , 0 ih a = , implies the undesirable action choice for this task. Let 
, {1,..., } ii h hn A A
∈ =×   denote the set of strategies for agent  i. Let  12 AAA = ×   denote the set 
of strategy profiles and  12 (,)
n aaa a A == ∈ denote a strategy profile. Therefore, the 
desirable strategy profile is denoted by 
** * *
12 (,)
n aaa aA = =∈ , which is defined as 
   
*
, 1 ih a =  for  all  {1,2} i∈  and  all  {1,..., } hn ∈ .   10
The principal is faced with a moral hazard problem in which she cannot observe 
the agents’ action choices but can only imperfectly monitor them by observing the 
public signal  , ih ω  for each task (, ) ih . Let  , {1, 2} ih Ω ≡  denote the set of public 
signals for task  (, ) ih. The public signal  ,, ih ih ω ∈Ω  for each task  (, ) ih is randomly 
drawn according to the probability function that depends on the action choice  , ih a  for 
this task. With regard to task  (, ) ih, the public signal  , 1 ih ω =  implies  the  good signal, 
whereas the public signal  , 0 ih ω =   implies the bad signal for this task. Let 
, {1,..., } ii h hn ∈ Ω≡ × Ω  denote the set of public signal profiles for agent  ' is  tasks, and let 
12 Ω≡Ω ×Ω   denote the set of public signal profiles. 
The public signals are imperfectly correlated across all the tasks as follows. There 
exists a macro shock  θ  that is unobservable by not only the principal but also the 
agents, and it is randomly drawn according to the probability density distribution  ( ) f θ  







= ∫ . Let us fix 
an arbitrary non-negative real number  0 α ≥ . Therefore, there exists an increasing and 
continuous function  :[0,1 ] [0,1] p α +→  such that for each ( , ) {1,2} {1,..., } ih n ∈× , 
, () ih pa αθ +  is the probability that the principal will observe the good signal  , 1 ih ω =  
for task  (, ) ih, provided the macro shock θ  occurs and agent i selects action  , ih a  
for this task. Hence, the public signals are correlated through the randomization of the   11
macro shock. Since  p   is increasing with respect to  θ , it follows that the stronger the 
macro shock θ , the better is the business for each task. Since  (1 ) p αθ +  is greater 
than ( ) p αθ  for all  [0,1] θ ∈ , it follows that the probability of the occurrence of the 
good signal for a task when action 1 is adopted is greater than that when action 0 is 
adopted. Since the principal is unable to observe the occurred macro shock and the 
chosen strategy profile, she is unable to verify whether the occurrence of the good 
public signals for the tasks was due to the agent’s adoption of the desirable action 
choices or the occurrence of a strong macro shock. We assume conditional 
independence, i.e., given the occurrence of the macro shock, the public signals are 
drawn randomly and independently. This implicitly assumes that there exist some 
private factors for each task that are drawn randomly and independently of each other 
and that influence the realization of the public signal. 
The payoff for agent i when he/she selects a strategy  ii aA ∈  and receives a 
monetary transfer  i tR ∈   is given by 













where  : uR R →  is an increasing function and 
, ih a
n
 implies the cost of selecting the 
action for task (, ) ih. Note that the desirable action choice is more costly than the 
undesirable action choice. Without loss of generality, we assume that   12
(0) 0 i u =  for  each  {1,2} i∈ . 
In order to incentivize the agents to select the desirable strategy profile 
* a , the 
principal will design a punishment rule for each agent {1, 2} i∈  that is defined as a 
function : [ ,0] i xH Ω→ − , where  0 H >  implies  the  upper bound of the monetary fine. 
Given a punishment rule  i x   for each agent  {1,2} i∈ , when a strategy profile  aA ∈  is 
selected, the expected payoff for agent  i  is defined by 
   
,














where ( | ) p a ω  denotes the probability that the public signal profile  ω  occurs when 




( , ) {1,2} {1,..., }: 0
0










≡− + ∏ ∫ . 
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+ ∏ . 
Let  12 (,) x xx =  denote a punishment rule. This paper uses the approximate Nash 
equilibrium concept, which is defined as follows. For each positive real number  0 ε > , 
a strategy profile  aA ∈  is said to be an  ε −Nash equilibrium for a punishment rule 
x  if for every  {1,2} i∈ , every  i aA ′∈ , and for  j i ≠ , 
(; ) ( , ; ) iii i j i vax vaax ε ′ ≥− . 
This implies that for each agent, the gain from deviating from an  ε −Nash equilibrium   13
is less than or equal to  ε , provided that the other agent plays this  ε −Nash equilibrium. 
Note that the ε − Nash equilibrium concept is equivalent to the standard Nash 
equilibrium concept when  0 ε = . 
  This paper examines a case in which the principal delegates a large number of 
tasks to each agent. An interpretation is as follows. In order to adopt the desirable action 
choices for 2n  tasks, the principal hires 2n  workers and divides them into two 
separate groups; each group has the same number of workers. The members of each 
group enter into a binding agreement to jointly adopt the action choices for the  n tasks 
that the principal delegates and maximize the sum of their expected payoffs. 
  This paper aims to design a punishment rule for which the desirable strategy 
profile 
* a  is an approximate Nash equilibrium; moreover, every approximate Nash 
equilibrium induces the desirable action choices for almost all the tasks and rarely fines 
the agents. The reasons why the principal dislikes fining the agents even though they 
adopt the desirable action choices for all the tasks are as follows. Suppose that each 
agent {1,2} i∈  has an outside opportunity that provides him/her with a payoff that is 













. If he/she is fined with a positive probability, 
playing the desirable strategy 
*
i a  would not satisfy the participation constraint; 
therefore, the agent is incentivized not to participate in the principal’s business. Hence,   14
in order to prevent this agent from leaving, the principal must provide him/her with an 
extra monetary payment; consequently, the principal fails to extract the full surplus. 
Next, suppose that the agents are risk averse with respect to the monetary transfers, i.e., 
i u  is concave for each  {1,2} i∈ . If each agent is fined with a positive probability, the 
principal fails to achieve the first-best allocation because of the welfare distortion 
caused by this risk-averse agent’s risk sharing. 
 
3. Relative Performance Evaluation 
 
Let us arbitrarily fix a positive integer  1 n ≥   and a positive integer 
( ) {1,..., } nn λ λ =∈ . We specify a punishment rule 
n x x =  as follows. For every 
{1, 2} i∈  and  for  j i ≠ , 
(1)     ( ) i x H ω =−  if  ,, ,
11 1




np ωω λ ω λ
== =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ≤− + − ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑∑ ∑ , 
and 
(2)     ( ) 0 i x ω =  otherwise. 
We can regard the above specification of 
n x  as a hybrid of the relative 
performance evaluation method and the absolute performance evaluation method as 
follows. If the absolute value of the difference between the number of good signals for   15
agent  ' is  tasks and that of the other agent  ' j s tasks is greater than or equal to  λ , 
i.e., 







−≥ ∑∑ , 
then the principal will evaluate each agent’s performance according to the relative 
performance evaluation method as follows. If the number of good signals for agent  ' is  








−≥ ∑∑ , 
then agent  i  is fined a monetary amount  H , whereas agent  j   is never fined. 
On the other hand, if the absolute value of the difference between the number of 









−< ∑∑ , 
then the principal will evaluate each agent’s performance according to the absolute 
performance evaluation method as follows. Let us consider  (1) np  as the threshold to 
determine whether an agent should be fined or not. Here,  (1) p  implies the probability 
that a good signal will occur for a task when action 1 is chosen, and the weakest macro 
shock  0 θ =  occurs. If the number of good signals for agent  ' is  tasks is less than or 
equal to this threshold, i.e.,     16








≤ ∑ , 
then agent  i is fined a monetary amount  H . However, if the number of good signals 
for agent  ' is   tasks is greater than this threshold, he/she is not fined. Note that although 
the inequality (3) holds, agent  i  is not fined if this number is relatively larger than that 















+ ∑ . 
 
4. The Theorem 
 
In this paper, we will assume that 
(4)     ( ) 1 uH −≤ − , 
which should be considered as a necessary condition for the existence of a well-behaved 
punishment rule. In fact, without this assumption (4), it is impossible for the principal to 
resolve the incentive problem even for the perfect monitoring case. Let us consider a 
situation in which the principal can perfectly monitor the agents’ action choices. With 
assumption (4), by fining any agent who selects action 0 for  m  tasks irrespective of 
{1,..., } mn ∈   with a monetary amount 
mH
n
, the principal can incentivize the agents to 
select 
* a  as a Nash equilibrium. Without this assumption, however, the principal is   17
unable to compel the agents to select 
* a  as a Nash equilibrium although she can 
perfectly monitor their action choices. The following theorem shows that generally, this 
assumption, i.e., (4), is almost sufficient for unique implementation in the imperfect 
monitoring case. 
 
The Theorem:  There exists an infinite sequence of positive integers  1 (() ) n n λ
∞
=  that 
satisfies the following three properties. 
(i)   ( ) {1,..., } nn λ ∈  for  all  1 n ≥ . 
(ii)   For  every  0 ε > , there exists n  such that for every nn ≥  and every 
{1, 2} i∈ , when 
* n a  is selected, the probability that agent i is fined, i.e., 
()
n
i x H ω =− , is less than  ε . 
(iii)   For every  0 ε > , there exists n  such that for every nn ≥ , 
* n a  is a 
ε −Nash equilibrium for 
n x . 
(iv)  If the strict inequality of (4) holds, i.e., 
()1 uH −< − , 
then for every  0 η > , there exist  0 ε >  and n  such that for every  nn ≥ , 
there exists no  ε −Nash equilibrium 
n aa =  for 
n x  that  satisfies   18











 for  some  {1, 2} i∈ . 
 
  The above theorem states that if the number of tasks that each agent is delegated is 
sufficiently large, then 
* a  is an approximate Nash equilibrium; moreover, every 
approximate Nash equilibrium can induce the agents to adopt the desirable action 
choices for almost all the tasks and rarely fines them. Hence, the principal succeeds in 
achieving the desirable action choices for all the tasks and extracts the full surplus 
without any substantial welfare loss. 
  Although the complete proof of this theorem will be presented in the next section, 
the following is a brief outline of it. Consider a sufficiently large  n. The Law of Large 
Numbers implies that when each agent  {1,2} i∈  selects 
*
i a , irrespective of the macro 









 is around  (1 ) p θ + . This implies that when 
the agents select 


















 are  almost  identical. 
Hence, it is almost certain that in the relative performance evaluation method, the agents 













 is greater than  (1) p  for each  {1,2} i∈ ; therefore, the agents are never fined   19
under the absolute performance evaluation method as well. Hence, with a sufficiently 
large  n, 
** n aa =  almost surely induces  ( ) 0 i x ω =  for each  {1,2} i∈ , i.e., property 
(ii) holds. 
  Let us arbitrarily fix  (0,1) ε ∈ . When each agent  {1,2} i∈  adopts action 0 for 









 is around 
(1 ) { (1 ) ( )} pp p θ εθ θ +− +− , which is less than  (1 ) p θ +  by the positive value 
{( 1 ) () } pp ε θθ +− . This implies that the relative performance evaluation method can 
almost certainly detect agent  ' is   deviation, as long as the other agent  j i ≠  plays 
*
j a . 
This along with (3) implies that 
* a  is an approximate Nash equilibrium, i.e., property 
(iii) holds. 
  Finally, consider any strategy profile  a, according to which an agent adopts action 
0 for some tasks. If the macro shock that occurred is sufficiently weak, it is almost 








< ∑ . Hence, in the absolute performance evaluation method, 
some agents are fined with a positive probability. On the other hand, the Law of Large 
Numbers implies that if an agent can alter the proportion of tasks for which he/she 
adopts the desirable action choices to be slightly greater than that for which the other 
agent adopts the desirable action choices, then this agent can almost certainly evade this 
fine. This contradicts the approximate Nash equilibrium concept. Hence, we have   20
proved that every approximate Nash equilibrium can induce the agents to adopt the 




5. Proof of the Theorem 
 
The Law of Large Numbers implies that irrespective of θ , with a sufficiently 









 is  around 
,,
11





















 is  around 
,,
11










provided that the agents select a and the macro shock θ  occurs. Hence, we can 
                                                 
6  In this paper, we do not consider the possibility that the agents overwork. However, it is very 
easy to resolve this issue by modifying the specification of the punishment rule such that each 
agent is fined whenever the proportion of his/her tasks for which good public signals occur is 
greater than  (1 ) p α + . 
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select  1 (() ) n n λ
∞








→∞ = . 








−< ∑∑  when 
* n a  is  selected 
converges to unity as  n  increases. 
Moreover, for each  {1,2} i∈ , 








> ∑  when agent i selects 
* n
i a  converges to 
unity as  n increases. 
Property (v) implies that it is almost certain that under the relative performance 
evaluation method, the agents are never fined. Property (vi) implies that it is almost 
certain that the agents are never fined under the absolute performance evaluation 
method. Hence, with a sufficiently large  n, 
* n a  almost surely induces  ( ) 0 i x ω =  for 
each {1,2} i∈ , i.e., property (ii) holds. 
  Let us arbitrarily fix  0 ε > . We prove property (iii), i.e., with a sufficiently large 
n, 
** n aa =  is an ε −Nash equilibrium, as follows. Suppose that there exists 
*
ii aa ≠  
such that 
(5)    
** (, ) () iij i uaa ua ε >+ . 
Note that the number of tasks for which agent  i  chooses action 0 must be greater than 








−> ∑ . 










 is  around 
,
1










which is greater than the positive value 
{( 1 ) ( ) } 0 pp αθα θ ε + −> . 














, and therefore, agent i  is almost certainly fined. Hence, 














which is non-positive, because of (4). This contradicts (5). Hence, we have proved that 
with a sufficiently large  n, 
* n a  is  an ε −Nash equilibrium. 
  We prove property (iv) as follows. Since  ( ) p ⋅  is continuous and increasing, it 
follows that for every  0 η > , there exists 
*() 0 θθ η = >  such  that 
    (1) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) pp p η αθ η αθ = +− + . 
Let us arbitrarily fix  0 η > . From the strict inequality of (4), we can choose  0 ε >  
such that   23
(6)    
* min[ ( ) ( ), ( ) 1] 3 ii uH uH θ ηε − −− − − > . 




















≤ ∑∑ . 
From the definition of 
*() θ η , it follows that when the occurred macro shock is weaker 
than 
*() θ η , in the case of a sufficiently large  n , it is almost certain that 
,,
11




np n ωω λ
==
⎡⎤ ≤+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∑∑ . 
This implies that the probability that agent  i  is fined is at least around 










≤−< ∑∑ . 









− ∑ ∑ 
 is around 








−≥ ∑∑ ; therefore, 
agent  i  is almost certainly never fined. Hence,  (, ) ( ) iij i uaa ua −    is at least around 
* () ( ) 2 i uH θ ηε −− −  , 
which is greater than ε , because of (6). This implies that a  is not an ε −Nash 
equilibrium.   24








−≥ ∑∑ . 











is at least around 
{( 1 ) ( ) } pp αθα θ ε + − , 











; therefore, agent  i is almost certainly fined. When agent  i 
selects 
*
i a  instead of  i a , for a sufficiently large  n, it is almost certain that he/she is 
never fined. Hence, 
* (,) ( ) ii j i uaa ua −  is  around 
,








= −− − + ≥ −− −
∑
, 
which is greater than ε , because of (6). This implies that a  is not an ε −Nash 
equilibrium. Hence, we have proved that with a sufficiently large  n, there exists no 











, i.e., property (iv) holds. 
Q.E.D.   25
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